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A movement toward ﬁscal decentralization is underway in many countries
across the world. This movement is partly justiﬁed by appeal to the clas-
sic argument of Tiebout (1956), who claimed that decentralized provision of
public goods allows better fulﬁllment of diverse individual demands. Many
commentators, however, have expressed concern that the conditions justify-
ing Tiebout’s argument are not present in many developing countries. This
paper analyzes the consequences of altering Tiebout’s model to include local
corruption and tax evasion, which may exist in many developing countries.
The analysis shows that these forces indeed limit the beneﬁts from ﬁscal de-
centralization. By raising public-good costs, corruption cancels some of the
gains from better demand fulﬁllment, which arise as Tiebout sorting generates
homogeneous local jurisdictions. By creating incentives for mixing, thereby
preventing formation of homogeneous communities, tax evasion may block the
operation of the Tiebout mechanism, eliminating the gains from ﬁscal decen-
tralization.
Key Words: Fiscal decentralization; Corruption; Tax evasion.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: H1, H2, H4, H7.
1. INTRODUCTION
Pursuit of ﬁscal decentralization is now widespread all across the world,
as both developed and countries attempt to follow the example of the na-
tions like the U.S., where local and regional governments enjoy considerable
ﬁscal independence. Decentralization is justiﬁed in part by an appeal to
the classic argument of Tiebout (1956), who claimed that decentralization
* I wish to thank Heng-fu Zou for helpful comments. Any deﬁciencies in the paper,
however, are my responsibility.
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leads to greater variety in the provision of public goods, allowing better
fulﬁllment of the diverse demands for public spending in the population.
Another justiﬁcation was provided by Oates (1993), who claimed that when
growth-enhancing public infrastructure spending is carried out at the local
or regional level, greater beneﬁts emerge. The reason is that infrastructure
projects are then better suited to local conditions, so that their contribution
to growth is more substantial.1 Taking a diﬀerent perspective, Brueckner
(1999) argues that, by better fulﬁlling the diverse public-good demands
of diﬀerent age groups in the economy, ﬁscal decentralization aﬀects the
incentive to save, thus altering capital accumulation and growth, possibly
in a positive direction.
While the push for decentralization in part reﬂects Tiebout’s powerful
intellectual legacy, many commentators recognize the potential fallacy of
basing policy prescriptions for developing countries on a theory inspired
by observation of ﬁscal aﬀairs in a highly-developed country like the U.S.
These commentators worry that, although the preconditions for beneﬁcial
ﬁscal decentralization may exist in the U.S., they may be absent in many
LDC’s. If so, decentralization may yield few beneﬁts, and may actually be
harmful, when pursued in the developing country context.
The relevant diﬀerences between developing countries and developed
countries are discussed in a number of studies. For example, Litvack,
Ahmad and Bird (1998) argue that a key ingredient of Tiebout’s model,
namely the ability of consumers to “vote with their feet,” may be miss-
ing in developing countries. Low incomes and poor information ﬂows may
limit interjurisdictional mobility, preventing consumers from sorting them-
selves on the basis of their demands for public goods, as envisioned by
Tiebout. In the absence of such sorting, many of the potential gains from
decentralization cannot be realized.
Even if consumers are able vote with their feet, other imperfections in
developing countries may block the fulﬁllment of Tiebout’s theory, as noted
by Tanzi (1996). For example, bureaucrats in local and regional govern-
ments may be poorly trained and thus ineﬃcient in delivering public goods
and services to the population. When delivered subnationally, the per-
capita cost of such services is then higher than if they were delivered by
the national government, whose bureaucracy may be more eﬃcient. Ex-
actly the same conclusion applies if all bureaucrats are equally eﬃcient
but corruption is more extensive at the local and regional levels than at
the national level. The cost of subnational public-good provision is again
higher, but the diﬀerential now serves to line the pockets of the bureau-
1The connection between growth and decentralization is explored in a series of em-
pirical studies by Zhang and Zou (1998), Davoodi and Zou (1998), and Xie, Zou and
Davoodi (1999). Some of the ﬁndings disconﬁrm Oates’s prediction, showing a negative
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cracy rather than to oﬀset technical ineﬃciencies in production. In both
situations, the higher cost of subnational public-good provision limits the
beneﬁts from ﬁscal decentralization. In developed countries, by contrast,
technical eﬃciency is high across all levels of government, and corruption
is mostly absent at both the subnational and national levels, so that no
such limitations exist.
Tanzi (1996) also argues that taxes levied at the subnational level may
exhibit poor “productivity” relative to national taxes. One reason may
be weak administration of income or property taxes by subnational gov-
ernments, which allows consumers to engage in substantial and costless
tax evasion. This outcome appears to limit the usefulness of such taxes
as revenue sources, calling into question the ability of subnational govern-
ments to function as independent ﬁscal entities. In developed countries, by
contrast, evasion of taxes levied by subnational governments is typically
diﬃcult, eliminating this obstacle to successful ﬁscal decentralization.
The purpose of the present paper is to explore these ideas by provid-
ing an elementary, diagrammatic analysis of the eﬀects of corruption and
tax evasion on the beneﬁts of ﬁscal decentralization. The contribution of
this exercise is to provide a formal demonstration of how Tiebout’s theory
changes when some new ingredients that may characterize developing coun-
tries are added. While most of the discussion retains the assumption that
consumers can vote with their feet, the eﬀect of removing interjurisdictional
mobility is also noted.
The analysis of corruption, which is presented in Section 2, is straightfor-
ward. It identiﬁes a simple trade-oﬀ between better satisfaction of diverse
public-good demands under ﬁscal decentralization, on the one hand, and
higher costs of provision due to subnational corruption, on the other. Fis-
cal decentralization is welfare improving only if the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates
the latter. If interjurisdictional mobility is absent, as argued by Litvack
et al. (1998), then the ﬁrst beneﬁcial eﬀect is not even realized, and ﬁscal
decentralization serves only to raise the cost of public-good provision.
Analysis of the eﬀect of tax evasion, which is presented in Section 3,
generates some unexpected conclusions. The analysis assumes that one
class of consumers (in particular, the high public-good demanders) is able
to evade a portion of its subnational tax bill while the other class is not.
As long as consumers are separated in homogeneous jurisdictions, this tax
evasion has no eﬀect. Because tax evaders ultimately care about public
goods, they mutually agree to levy a larger tax bill (recognizing that only
a portion will be paid) in order to generate the desired amount of public
expenditure.
By contrast, when evaders and nonevaders live together in a mixed juri-
sidiction, the evaders beneﬁt from underpayment of taxes, paying less than
their fair share of public-good costs. While the evaders (who are in the mi-4 JAN K. BRUECKNER
nority) forsake the ability to control public spending, their lower taxes may
make living in a mixed jurisdiction preferable. Such intermixing, however,
ruins the economy’s ability to match public goods to individual demands,
so that the beneﬁts of ﬁscal decentralization may disappear under tax eva-
sion. Thus, instead of causing a collapse of public-good provision at the
subnational level, tax evasion limits the beneﬁts from decentralization by
interfering with the process of Tiebout sorting.
The next two sections of the paper demonstrate the above conclusions.
While the analysis in these sections explores potential failures of the Tiebout
mechanism in an abstract fashion, Section 4 asks the broader question of
whether the Tiebout approach is even relevant in a particular group of coun-
tries. Focusing on Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, the
discussion reviews the details of the institutional structures of these coun-
tries, asking whether state and local jurisdictions enjoy the ﬁscal autonomy
that is required for the Tiebout mechanism to operate. The conclusions
are not encouraging, suggesting that fundamental institutional rigidities
may prevent realization of some of the beneﬁts of decentralization, inde-
pendently of the eﬀects of corruption and tax evasion.
2. THE EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION
The analysis is based on the simplest possible model. The economy
contains two types of individuals, high and low demanders of the public
good (denoted h and l). The single public good, denoted z, is a private
good produced with constant returns to scale. This means that the cost
per unit of z is a constant c, and that an expenditure of ncz is needed to
generate public consumption z in a jurisdiction of size n, yielding a per-
capita cost of cz. Economies of jurisdiction size are thus absent, so that
per-capita public-good costs would be the same at the national and local
levels in the absence of local corruption. With corruption, however, the
unit cost at the local level assumes the higher value e c, with e c > c. For
simplicity, all subnational governments are referred to as “local” in the
ensuing discussion, recognizing that the conclusions also apply to regional
governments.
The public good is ﬁnanced by a system of head taxes levied on a juris-
diction’s residents. When a given z is provided nationally, each individual
pays a head tax of cz. With local provision, a jurisdiction’s head tax
equals e cz. Majority rule determines the public good in any jurisdiction,
national or local. Since high-demand consumers are assumed to be in the
minority, accounting for a fraction θ < 1
2 of the national population, the
public good in the mixed national jurisdiction is chosen to satisfy members
of the low-demand majority. In the homogeneous local jurisdictions thatFISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5
emerge under ﬁscal decentralization, voters are identical, so that majority
rule leads to unanimous choices.
The eﬀect of ﬁscal decentralization can be analyzed using Figure 1. The
Figure shows the demand curves of the two consumer types, denoted Dh
and Dl, along with horizontal lines representing the national and local unit
costs, c and e c. Since majority rule in the mixed national jurisdiction gives
power to the low demanders, the public good is provided at their preferred
level, z∗
l . The high demanders would like a higher level, namely z∗
h, but
their minority status rules out consuming this much of the public good.
Now suppose that ﬁscal decentralization occurs. The single national
jurisdiction, which provides the same level of z to everyone, is then replaced
by local jurisdictions that can provide diﬀerent public-good levels to suit
the preferences of their residents. With a variety of z levels available,
consumers then vote with their feet, moving to the jurisdiction providing
their preferred amount of the public good. Consumers thus sort into two
types of homogeneous jurisdictions, containing high and low demanders
respectively.
Assume for a moment that local corruption is absent, so that the local
cost of z equals the national value, c. Low demanders, retaining control
of public-good provision in their own homogeneous jurisdictions, then con-
sume the same z as was provided at the national level, namely z∗
l . In both
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cases, the consumer surplus enjoyed by the low demanders is given by the
area N + O + P in Figure 1.
By voting with their feet under ﬁscal decentralization, high-demand con-
sumers gain control over the amount of z they consume. Again assuming
the absence of local corruption, high demanders set the public good level
at z∗
h in each of their homogeneous local jurisdictions. This leads to a gain
in consumer surplus, which rises by the amount R + S as z is increased,
starting from the initial level of L + M + N + O + P + Q under national
provision. The per-capita social gain from ﬁscal decentralization is then
θ(R + S), where θ is again the high-demand population share.
When local corruption is reintroduced, most aspects of the above dis-
cussion are unchanged. High- and low-demand consumers still have an
incentive to form homogeneous jurisdictions, each of which provides its
residents with exactly their preferred public-good level. But because cor-
ruption raises the cost of provision from c to e c, this demand fulﬁllment
takes place under unfavorable cost conditions.
Instead of providing z∗
l , voters in local low-demand jurisdictions respond
to the higher cost of the public good by choosing the lower level e zl. The
surplus enjoyed by low-demand consumers falls from to N from N +O+P,
for a loss of O + P relative to the case of national provision.
High-demand consumers again beneﬁt from the freedom to choose z,
but they suﬀer from the cost escalation caused by local corruption. High-
demand jurisdictions set the public-good level at e zh, an amount less than
the z∗
h that would have been chosen in the absence of corruption. High-
demand consumers enjoy a surplus level of L + M + N + R with local
corruption, which diﬀers from the surplus L + M + N + O + P + Q under
nation provision. The change in high-demand surplus due to ﬁscal decen-
tralization is thus equal to R−(O+P +Q), which could be either positive
or negative. If the surplus lost as a result of corruption’s cost escalation,
which equals O+P +Q, is smaller than the surplus gained from the ability
to control z, which equals R, then high-demand consumers beneﬁt from
ﬁscal decentralization. Otherwise, they lose. Figure 1 shows the latter
case.
Because low-demanders are unambiguously harmed, the social gain from
decentralization is also negative in the situation shown in Figure 1. On a
per-capita basis, the social gain equals θ[R−(O+P +Q)]−(1−θ)(O+P) =
(1−θ)(R−Q)−(O +P) < 0. Such a loss will arise whenever the demand
diﬀerence between the consumer types is suﬃciently small relative to the
diﬀerence between e c and c. In this situation, the high-demand consumers’
gain from being able to adjust public spending is small relative to the cost
escalation from local corruption. The area R, whose contribution is positive
in the above social-gain expression, is then small relative to the other areas,
making the expression negative.FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7
This discussion shows that in the presence of local corruption, the bene-
ﬁts of ﬁscal decentralization may vanish. The unfavorable cost conditions
generated by corruption are likely to cancel the gains from adjusting public
consumption to suit individual preferences. When interjurisdictional mo-
bility is absent, so that voting with one’s feet is not an option, then the
verdict is even worse. In this case, the population stays frozen in place
as devolution of ﬁscal responsibilities occurs, so that each local jurisdic-
tion is likely to maintain a mixed population reﬂecting the nation’s overall
population composition. Majority voting then determines the outcome in
each local jursdiction, mimicking the case of national provision, but with a
higher cost of the public good. In this case, both high and low demanders
are guaranteed to suﬀer surplus losses as a result of ﬁscal decentralization,
making the policy counterproductive.
The preceding discussion applies equally well to the alternate case where
local provision of public goods is technically ineﬃcient rather than subject
to corruption. Fiscal decentralization once again entails an increase in
public-sector costs, which may overwhelm the gains from better fulﬁllment
of public-good demands. Because of this eﬀect, decentralization again may
be counterproductive.
As a ﬁnal point, it is interesting to explore the eﬀects of reversing the
maintained assumption on the location of corruption, assuming instead that
corruption exists at the national rather than the local level. In support
of this reverse assumption, it could be argued that competition between
local governments for population and business investment disciplines their
behavior, limiting the scope of corruption. By contrast, the absence of
intergovernmental competition at the national level might allow corruption
to ﬂourish.
In this situation, ﬁscal decentralization generates dual beneﬁts. While
the population’s diverse demands for public goods are again fulﬁlled, the
absence of corruption at the local level leads to a lower, rather than higher,
cost of public-good provision following decentralization. To quantify these
beneﬁts in Figure 1, observe that the public good would be provided at
cost e c at the national level, with the level e zl chosen under majority rule.
The resulting surplus levels are L+N for the high-demand consumers and
N for the low-demanders. Decentralization would reduce the public-good
cost to c, and the chosen levels of provision would be z∗
h and z∗
l in the
high and low-demand jurisdictions. High-demand surplus would rise to
L+M +N +O+P +Q+R+S, for a gain of M +O+P +Q+R+S, while
low-demand surplus would rise to N + O + P, for a gain of O + P. The
social gain from decentralization would equal O + P + θ(M + Q + R + S).
By circumventing corruption at the national level as well as allowing con-
sumers to vote with their feet, ﬁscal decentralization yields unambiguous
beneﬁts under this alternate scenario. Whether this case is more realistic8 JAN K. BRUECKNER
than the one where corruption resides at the local level is, of course, an
empirical quesion.
3. THE EFFECTS OF TAX EVASION
Tax evasion at the local level may also aﬀect the beneﬁts of decentral-
ization. To focus on these eﬀects, assume that local corruption is absent,
but that one class of consumers is able to partially evade local taxes. In
particular, suppose that the high-demand consumers pay only a fraction α
of their local tax bill. Although the literature on tax evasion (originated
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972)) analyzes the optimal choice of α on
the part of the tax evader, this parameter is taken as predetermined in the
present discussion. Similarly, the absence of evasion among the low-demand
consumers is not endogenously determined but rather is an imposed as-
sumption. Presumably, some diﬀerence between the groups (perhaps in
their levels of income) makes the high demanders more adept at tax eva-
sion. The reverse assumption, namely that the tax evaders are the low
rather than high demanders, would alter the discussion somewhat without
changing its overall message. However, as noted below, the assumption of
diﬀerential tax evasion is critical. The conclusions of the analysis would be
altered if the groups symmetrically evade taxes, paying identical fractions
of their true tax liabilities.
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀects of tax evasion when local jurisdictions are ho-
mogeneous. The low-demand jurisdictions are, of course, unaﬀected. In
high-demand jurisdictions, tax evasion means that each resident pays only
a fraction of his tax bill, with the payment equal to αcz. Since the resulting
revenue is insuﬃcient to support the given level of z, the jurisdiction needs
to send larger tax bills in order to generate enough revenue. Individual tax
liabilities must be set at cz/α, resulting in tax payments of α(cz/α) = cz.
Therefore, tax evasion in a homogeneous jurisdiction ultimately has no ef-
fect on the tax payment required to enjoy a given level of z. Consumers
must in the end pay equal shares of the cost of provision, leading to the
same tax payment as they would make in the absence of evasion.
The situation is diﬀerent in a mixed jurisdiction. To see this, consider
a local jurisdiction of size n where high demanders comprise a fraction λ
of the population. Let t represent the tax liability per unit of z for each
resident, which must satisfy the following government budget constraint:
αλntz + (1 − λ)ntz = ncz. (1)
Note in (1) that the high demanders pay only a fraction α of their tax
liability, while the low demanders pay 100 percent. Solving (1) for t yieldsFISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9
t =
c
αλ + (1 − λ)
. (2)




αλ + (1 − λ)
, pl =
cz
αλ + (1 − λ)
. (3)
Since ph < pl, the tax evaders pay less in taxes than the nonevaders. It is
easily veriﬁed that λnph + (1 − λ)npl = ncz, so that these payments cover
the cost of the public good.
It should be noted that if both groups symmetrically evade taxes, then
an α would appear in the second term in (1). The expression in (2) would
then equal c/α, and ph and pl would both equal cz. Thus, in computing the
ultimate tax burdens on consumers, symmetric tax evasion is equivalent to
no tax evasion at all. Another point to note is that the current model of
asymmetric tax evasion is formally equivalent to a model with property
or income taxes rather than head taxes. In such a model, tax payments
diﬀer across individuals depending on their level of housing consumption
or the amount of income earned. Here, tax payments vary according to
one’s ability to evade taxation.
The key implication of tax evasion is that high demanders can pay less
than their fair share of taxes in a mixed jurisdiction. By spurring formation
of mixed rather than homogeneous jurisdictions, this fact may limit the
beneﬁts of ﬁscal decentralization, which arise from fulﬁllment of diverse
public-good demands as consumers sort into homogeneous groups.
To explore the incentive to mix, suppose that ﬁscal decentralization oc-
curs and that the economy is initially organized into homogeneous high-
and low-demand jurisdictions. Then, consider whether high demanders
have an incentive to move into a low-demand jurisdiction. To do so, focus
initially on the ﬁrst mover, who becomes a minority of one in the low-
demand jurisdiction. His tax payment is computed by setting λ = 0 in
(3), reﬂecting the fact that the low-demand jurisdiction starts out homoge-
neous and experiences a negligible increase in its high-demand proportion
as the ﬁrst mover enters. Making this substitution, the tax payments in
(3) become ph = αcz and pl = cz.
Figure 2 illustrates this situation, showing the demand curves, Dh and
Dl, and the unit cost lines at heights c and αc. If the high-demand con-
sumer were to stay in his own homogeneous jurisdiction, he would enjoy
a surplus level of E + G. By moving as a minority of one into the low-
demand jurisdiction, he has to settle for the lower public-good level z∗
l , set
according to low-demand preferences. But the high-demand mover reaps
the beneﬁts of tax evasion by paying less than his fair share of the cost. The10 JAN K. BRUECKNER










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































mover’s surplus in the low-demand jurisdiction equals E+F, and a move is
worthwhile when this surplus level exceeds that in the original jurisdiction,
which requires that F > G. This inequality, which is satisﬁed in Figure 2,
says that the loss from lower consumption of the public good (G) is more
than oﬀset by the gain from lower taxes (F).2 For the inequality F > G to
be satisﬁed, creating an incentive for the formation of mixed communities,
the demand diﬀerence between the groups must be suﬃciently small rela-
tive to the extent of tax evasion. This makes the gap between the demand
curves small relative to the gap between the cost lines, ensuring that the
area G is smaller than F, as in Figure 2. Thus, substantial tax evasion on
the part of one group may interfere with the emergence of homogeneous
jurisdictions.
To see the ultimate outcome, the incentives faced by subsequent high-
demand movers beyond the ﬁrst must be analyzed. As additional high-
demand residents enter the low-demand jurisdiction, the high-demand pro-
portion λ rises away from zero. Since the common denominator of the
expressions in (3) falls as λ increases, the cost lines in Figure 1 rise for
2It should be noted that the analysis imposes the implicit assumption that the low
demanders cannot prevent the invasion of their jurisdiction (which they dislike), and
that they cannot escape by forming yet another homogeneous jurisdiction. The latter
case leads to a game of “musical chairs,” which has no equilibrium.FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11
both types of taxpayers. Responding to the higher tax burden, the ju-
risdiction’s low-demand majority cuts the level of the public good. This
makes the jurisdiction look less attractive to potential movers, and this
eﬀect is compounded by the rising high-demand tax burden, a consequence
of the growing presence of tax evaders in the jurisdiction.
To understand the operation of these forces, consider Figure 3. This
Figure shows the mixed jurisdiction under the assumption that it has been
fully invaded by high-demand consumers, whose population share λ now
equals their overall share θ. In this diagram, the area L + M + Q + R
corresponds to the area F in Figure 2, while the area S corresponds to the
area G, areas that apply when λ = 0. Since L + M + Q + R − S > 0,
the ﬁrst mover ﬁnds that entry into the low-demand jurisdiction raises his
surplus, as in Figure 2.
As λ rises from zero to θ, the unit cost of z rises from c to c/[αθ+(1−θ)]
for the low demanders, who respond by cutting the public-good level from
z∗
l to ˆ zl. Because unit cost for the high-demanders is also larger, being
equal to αc/[αθ + (1 − θ)] > αc, the surplus generated from this smaller z
equals I +J +K +L. Since a surplus of I +J +K +N +O+P +S applies
in the homogeneous high-demand jurisdiction, the surplus advantage of the
fully-mixed jurisdiction equals L−(N +O+P +S). This advantage is less
than the one encountered by the ﬁrst mover, which equals L+M+Q+R−S.
But the advantage is, in fact, negative in the situation shown in Figure 3,
indicating that the fully-mixed jurisdiction generates lower surplus than
the homogeneous jurisdiction.
In this case, the fully-mixed jurisdiction is not sustainable, and incom-
plete mixing occurs instead. To see this, observe that the surplus advantage
of the low-demand jurisdiction starts out positive when λ = 0 and becomes
negative once λ has reached θ. Since the advantage is thus decreasing in λ,
there exists some intermediate value where it equals zero, indicating that
the associated incompletely-mixed jurisdiction and the homogeneous juris-
diction are equivalent. Some high-demand consumers then remain in the
homogeneous jurisdicition, while the remainder join the low demanders.
Although Figure 3 does not show this outcome, the fully-mixed jurisdic-
tion could be superior to the homogeneous jurisdiction, so that complete
mixing occurs. The condition guaranteeing this outcome is the same as
the one discussed above: the demand diﬀerence between the groups must
be suﬃciently small relative to the extent of tax evasion. If this condition
were to hold, the demand gap would be small relative to the unit cost gap
in a redrawn version of Figure 3, and the area N + O + P + S would then
be small relative to L, making L − (N + O + P + S) > 0.
When this inequality holds, tax evasion leads to complete intermixing of
high and low demanders. The resulting distortion of public-good provision
eliminates the social gain that ﬁscal decentralization would generate under12 JAN K. BRUECKNER
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































normal circumstances. The social gain of θS, which equals the population-
weighted surplus gain for high demanders from greater consumption of
z in homogeneous jurisdictions, is replaced instead by a social loss. To
compute this loss, observe that both groups continue to consume a common
public-good level, as they did under national provision, but that the level
of provision falls to ˆ zl. This generates a social losses of O for the low
demanders and (N +O+P) for the high demanders, for a total per-capita
loss of θ(N + P) + O. Thus, in the present model, the beneﬁts of ﬁscal
decentralization turn into losses when tax evasion short-circuits the process
of Tiebout sorting. This same conclusion holds under incomplete mixing,
but the social loss is smaller in magnitude.
It is worth noting that, in the absence of interjurisdictional mobility, a
social loss from decentralization is guaranteed rather than merely probable
when tax evasion occurs. Then, mixed local jurisdictions are inevitable,
and the above welfare loss is assured.
4. INSTITUTIONAL REALITIES
As discussed in the previous sections, the beneﬁts of ﬁscal decentraliza-
tion may be reduced or eliminated when corruption or tax evasion exists at
the local level. In the absence of such impediments, decentralization works
well in principle, provided that the institutional reality matches the other
elements of the Tiebout model. The key element is the autonomy of localFISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 13
governments in determining the levels of taxes and public expenditures.
This autonomy is important because it allows local governments to adjust
spending and taxes to suit the preferences of diﬀerent types of consumers,
who sort among jurisdictions as they vote with their feet.
A danger is that the ﬁscal decentralization eﬀort in a given country
may not provide true autonomy to local governments, as is required for
the operation of the Tiebout mechanism. Instead, local governments may
simply be assigned responsibility for provision of particular public goods,
with the levels of provision speciﬁed by the national government and the
necessary funds coming from national tax revenue via a revenue-sharing ar-
rangement. In this case, local governments lack the ability to adjust their
public-good levels in response to the preferences of their residents, and the
upshot is that functioning of the Tiebout mechanism is blocked. The prob-
lem is that, rather than having true autonomy, subnational jurisdictions
eﬀectively serve as agencies of the national government.
This issue can be explored using information from an excellent volume
edited by Ter-Minassian (1997), which contains detailed appraisals of ﬁs-
cal decentralization in 21 countries around the world. Focusing on the
experiences of ﬁve Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, and Mexico), the evidence is not particularly encouraging. In
particular, although there has been great progress toward ﬁscal decentral-
ization in these countries, regional and local governments typically lack
the autonomy enjoyed by such governments in a country like the United
States. As a result, it appears that the preconditions for realizing the full
beneﬁts of decentralization do not yet exist in most of these countries. Of
course, the obstacles explored in the above analysis (corruption and tax
evasion) may be still be a factor, but the evidence suggests that structural
rigidities may limit the gains from decentralization on a more fundamental
level. To provide greater detail, the ensuing discussion brieﬂy considers the
experiences of these ﬁve countries.
4.1. Argentina
The discussion of Argentina draws from the chapter by Schwartz and
Liuksila (1997) in the Ter-Minassian volume. As in other Latin American
countries, the provision of education and health care has been decentralized
in Argentina, with some responsibilities reassigned to the provinces and
municipalities by the federal government. Reﬂecting this devolution, the
federal government’s share of education spending fell from 44 percent in
1983 to 22 percent in 1992, with the provincial share rising from 49 to
70 percent. Similarly, the federal share of health-care expenditures fell
from 17 to 11 percent over this period, with municipal share rising by a
corresponding amount.14 JAN K. BRUECKNER
The tax revenue that pays for these services along with the other expen-
ditures of subnational governments originates largely at the federal level.
For example, while provincial governments accounted for 54 percent of
combined national and provincial spending in 1995, they generated only
20 percent of the combined national and provincial tax revenue, largely
through a provincial turnover (sales) tax. As a result, only 40 percent of
the provinces’ spending was covered by their own revenue, with the remain-
ing 60 percent supplied by transfers from the federal government, which
are based on provincial population and income. Similarly, municipalities
received 55 percent of their revenue in the form of transfers from provincial
governments. All told, the federal government in Argentina transfers 31
percent of its revenue to subnational governments through revenue shar-
ing.
Both subnational levels of government thus rely heavily on transfers,
whose magnitude is largely beyond their control. This absence of con-
trol is apparently compounded by a failure to exercise autonomy in the
areas where it is permitted. In particular, Schwartz and Liuksila state
that, although the provinces may determine the rate of the turnover tax,
they “have delegated much of their responsibility for legislating, adminis-
tering, and collecting taxes to the central government ...” Although most
provinces have granted autonomy to their municipalities, giving them “at
least in theory, the right to establish and administer their own taxes,” the
implication of this quote from Schwartz and Liuksila is that this right is
seldom exercised, so that municipalities operate with little actual auton-
omy.
The picture that emerges of ﬁscal decentralization in Argentina thus
matches the cautionary description above, with subnational governments
relying heavily on funds from revenue sharing and exerting little discre-
tion over the taxes that they are legally entitled to control. As a result, it
appears that even in the absence of worries about corruption and tax eva-
sion, the scope for operation of the Tiebout mechanism in Argentina may
be limited by the institutional setting. This problem may be compounded
by substantial tax evasion, which is evidenced by a low rate of compliance
with the national VAT (the 55 percent compliance rate is notably lower
than that in nearby countries).
4.2. Bolivia
The chapter by MacKenzie and Ruiz (1997) provides an overview of ﬁscal
decentralization in Bolivia. Since Bolivia is a relatively small country, there
is eﬀectively only one layer of government at the subnational level, namely
the municipalities. Fiscal decentralization, undertaken in 1996, gave the
municipalities full responsibility for elementary and secondary education
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municipal share of total government expenditure from 8 percent in 1993 to
16 percent in 1996. The municipal share of capital expenditures also grew
from 33 to 59 percent over this period, a result of the transfer of investment
projects from other subnational entities.
These municipal spending responsibilities are supported by revenue shar-
ing, under which 20 percent of national tax revenues are assigned to the
municipal governments using a formula based on population and income (a
smaller share than in Argentina). Such funds provided 85 percent of mu-
nicipal revenue in 1996, and the distribution rules require that 85 percent
of the transferred funds be spent for investment purposes. Municipalities
also levy property taxes, but since the rates are low, such taxes do not
constitute a signiﬁcant revenue source.
Fiscal decentralization in Bolivia thus follows the general pattern of Ar-
gentina. Subnational governments have been made responsible for a greater
share of expenditures, but they rely on transfers from the federal gov-
ernment for revenue, making little use of their own tax authority. Thus,
decentralization appears not to have created true ﬁscal autonomy at the
municipal level, with resulting limits on the beneﬁts that can be achieved.
4.3. Brazil
According to the chapter by Ter-Minassian (1997), the decentralization
trend in Brazil has been “more a response to the ﬁscal stress on the federal
budget ... than the result of a planned and orderly devolution of spending
responsibilities.” As in the cases of Argentina and Bolivia, this decentral-
ization trend (as well as previous spending patterns) have been supported
by intergovernmental transfers, with 22 percent of federal tax revenues dis-
tributed in transfers to states and municipalities. These entities, however,
are less reliant on federal transfers than in Argentina and Bolivia, with
transfers accounting for only 26 percent of combined state and municipal
revenue. The states rely mainly on a type of value-added tax for their own
revenue, while municipalities rely on a tax on services as well as real estate
transfer taxes. Along with federal transfers, these revenues support total
expenditures that amount to half of all government spending (federal plus
subnational) in the country.
The greater current self-suﬃciency of state and municipal governments
in Brazil, as compared to the cases of Argentina and Bolivia, testiﬁes to a
historical commitment to ﬁscal federalism as well to recent trends toward
greater decentralization. As a result of this self-suﬃciency, it would appear
the Tiebout mechanism has greater scope for operation in Brazil than in
the either Argentina or Bolivia.16 JAN K. BRUECKNER
4.4. Colombia
As described in the chapter by Ahmad and Baer (1997), a constitutional
change in Colombia in 1991 accelerated an existing trend toward ﬁscal
decentralization. Once again, decentralization was supported by increases
in federal transfers, which rose from 36.5 percent of federal revenue in 1993
to 44.5 percent (projected) in 1999. In the latter year, 20 percent of federal
revenues went to municipalities, while 24.5 percent went to departments
(regional governments). In contrast to the case of Brazil (and in common
with Argentina and Bolivia), transfers accounted for a substantial share of
subnational spending. In 1994, own tax revenue covered only 41.5 percent
of municipal expenditure while accounting for 63.7 percent of deparmental
expenditure.
Reliance on transfers is matched by heavy federal involvement in the dis-
bursement of funds, with most transfers being explicitly earmarked for par-
ticular uses. According to Ahmad and Baer, this practice reﬂects “a strong
tradition of centrally determined norms for expenditures, such as education
and health” as well as “accountability problems—the national government
is not sure that public monies will be used for ‘appropriate’ purposes,”
with “political and bureaucratic misuse of resources still ... widespread.”
More fundamentally, Ahmad and Baer state that the “departments and
most municipalities lack the institutional capacity to eﬀectively perform
assigned expenditure functions.”
This description suggests that, despite decentralization of spending, sub-
national governments in Colombia function as agencies of the national gov-
ernment rather than enjoying true autonomy. While this arrangement may
be necessary given the underdeveloped state of local and departmental ad-
mininstrative structures, it prevents realization of the full beneﬁts of ﬁscal
decentralization.
4.5. Mexico
As discussed in the chapter by Amieva-Huerta (1997), ﬁscal decentral-
ization in Mexico is an ongoing process that is by no means complete.
Decentralization is focusing on health and education expenditures, with
most progress being made in the latter case. For example, decentralization
of education from the federal to the state governments in 1993 cut the share
of all government workers employed at the federal level from 71 percent to
41 percent, while raising the share of state and municipal expenditures in
GDP from 1.2 percent to 3.3 percent. This change raised the spending
share of the subnational governments almost to parity with the national
government, whose share equaled 3.5 percent in 1993 (this ﬁgure excludes
public enterprises, which accounted for 7.3 percent of GDP).
Subnational spending is supported by revenue sharing, which claimed
19 percent of federal revenue in 1994. Transfers accounted for 50 percentFISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 17
of state revenue and 58 percent of municipal revenue in that year. The
remaining revenue at the state level came largely from a payroll tax, while
the main municipal revenue source is the property tax. Property-tax rates
are set at the state level, and their magnitudes are relatively low. Although
state control over this local tax limits the autonomy of municipalities, states
and municipalities enjoy a freedom that is not always present in the other
countries that have been considered, namely the freedom to spend most of
their revenue-sharing funds for any purpose.
Given this description, the ﬁscal structure in Mexico suﬀers from many
of the same limitations seen in the other countries. Subnational govern-
ments rely heavily on federal transfers to support spending. Sources of own
tax revenue are underdeveloped, and the tax rates are often not controlled
by the government receiving the revenue. Thus, as in the other cases con-
sidered, subnational governments in Mexico do not enjoy the substantial
autonomy that is required for operation of the Tiebout mechanism. As a
result, the full beneﬁts from ﬁscal decentralization may not be realized.
5. CONCLUSION
A movement toward ﬁscal decentralization is underway in many coun-
tries across the world. This movement is partly justiﬁed by appeal to the
classic argument of Tiebout (1956), who claimed that decentralized provi-
sion of public goods allows better fulﬁllment of diverse individual demands.
Many commentators, however, have expressed concern that the conditions
justifying Tiebout’s argument are not present in many developing coun-
tries. Consumers, it is argued, are unable to vote with their feet because
of limited mobility. In addition, local public-good provision may be costly
in LDC’s because of corruption or ineﬃciency, and local taxes may be un-
productive because of widespread evasion.
This paper has analyzed the eﬀects of local corruption and tax evasion,
showing that these forces indeed limit the beneﬁts from ﬁscal decentral-
ization. By raising public-good costs, corruption cancels some of the gains
from better demand fulﬁllment, which arise as Tiebout sorting generates
homogeneous local jurisdictions. By creating incentives for mixing, thereby
preventing formation of homogeneous communities, tax evasion may block
the operation of the Tiebout sorting mechanism, eliminating the gains from
ﬁscal decentralization.
The last section of the paper explored a more fundamental issue, namely
whether local governments in actuality enjoy the autonomy that is required
for full operation of the Tiebout mechanism. A review of ﬁscal arrange-
ments in ﬁve Latin American countries suggested that this precondition
is mostly absent, with Brazil being the only case where subnational gov-
ernments operate with substantial independence from the national govern-18 JAN K. BRUECKNER
ment. This conclusion suggests that the eﬀects of corruption and tax eva-
sion, although conceptually intriguing, may be less important than more-
fundamental limitations in the ﬁscal structures of countries undergoing
ﬁscal decentralization. Thus, a general conclusion from the paper is that a
mechanical application to developing countries of the traditional theories
of local public ﬁnance, which were developed in a First World context, may
be hazardous. Since institutional diﬀerences may impair the relevance of
these theories, they should be applied with great care.
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